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Phase-randomized optical homodyne detection is a well-known technique for performing quantum
state tomography. So far, it has been mainly considered a sophisticated tool for laboratory ex-
periments but unsuitable for practical applications. In this work, we change the perspective and
employ this technique to set up a practical continuous-variable quantum random number generator.
We exploit a phase-randomized local oscillator realized with a gain-switched laser to bound the
min-entropy and extract true randomness from a completely uncharacterized input, potentially con-
trolled by a malicious adversary. Our proof-of-principle implementation achieves an equivalent rate
of 270 Mbit/s. In contrast to other source-device-independent quantum random number generators,
the one presented herein does not require additional active optical components, thus representing a
viable solution for future compact, modulator-free, certified generators of randomness.
I. INTRODUCTION
Randomness is an essential resource in many areas of
science and information technology. The problem of ac-
cessing true randomness has recently led to the proposal
of a variety of random number generator designs [1].
So-called “device-independent” (DI) quantum-random-
number generators (QRNGs) minimize the assumptions
underlying the randomness generation process by associ-
ating it with the violation of Bell inequalities [2–5]. How-
ever, the complexity of the setups and small generation
rates strongly limit their practical use.
Trusted QRNGs exploit a trusted environment for
the preparation and the measurement of the quantum
states from which the random numbers are extracted.
This makes it possible to build compact and fast gen-
erators, suitable for real-world applications. However,
due to their very nature, any hidden side channel in the
trusted environment compromises the unpredictability of
the generated numbers.
Semi-device-independent QRNGs represent an inter-
mediate solution to achieve a high level of practical-
ity. They introduce a minimal set of assumptions either
on the measurement [6–9] or on the preparation [10–
12] parts of the generator. The latter, so-called source
device-independent (SDI) QRNGs, relieve the user (Al-
ice) from the burden of a perfect quantum state prepara-
tion. The most paranoid scenario is when an evil party
(Eve) replaces Alice’s input state with her own state so
that the generated numbers look random to Alice but ac-
tually are not. In this framework, Alice can counteract
Eve’s attack by applying measurements that are out of
Eve’s reach.
In this work we introduce a continuous-variable (CV)
SDI QRNG with which we demonstrate generation rates
of 270 Mbit/s. Typical CV-QRNGs feature optical ho-
modyne detection to measure a quadrature observable of
an input quantum state [13–21]. The quadrature is se-
lected by the phase of a classical field, the so-called local
oscillator (LO), which interferes with the input field. The
LO is typically a continuous-wave laser. In our SDI pro-
tocol, the laser is pulsed and gain switched such that each
pulse features a random phase [22–26]. This allows us to
use the tomographic technique of phase-randomized ho-
modyne detection [27–29] for random number generation,
the security of which follows from randomly changing the
phase of the LO.
Unlike other recently introduced SDI CV-QRNGs [30–
32], ours features the same optical setup as a typical CV-
QRNG. No additional optical components are required.
The phase randomization of the LO, which is the key
element of our generator, is obtained without resorting
to a phase modulator. This let us relax the security as-
sumptions on the input state without increasing the com-
plexity of the setup. We refer to Fig. 1 to illustrate the
difference between our SDI CV-QRNG and a typical one.
CV-QRNGs use balanced homodyne detection (BHD)
to measure a quadrature observable Q of an input state
ρA. This corresponds to Alice applying the quadrature
operator Qˆθ =
1√
2
(
ei
θ
2 aˆ† + e−i
θ
2 aˆ
)
on ρA, where aˆ
† and
aˆ are the creation and annihilation operators such that
[aˆ, aˆ†] = 1 holds and θ is the phase of the LO, which is
usually fixed. The eigenvalue equation for Qˆθ is Qˆθ|qθ〉 =
qθ|qθ〉, with qθ a real number.
Since the generator is characterized by a finite resolu-
tion δ, the measurements of the quadratures return the
raw random numbers qθ,k, where k is the bin index of
the intervals Ikδ =
(
k − δ2 , k + δ2
]
, with the central bin
corresponding to k = 0 [33].
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2FIG. 1. (a) Schematics of a typical CV-QRNG. The input state ρA is assumed to be prepared by Alice, so it is trusted and
lies within the security perimeter (red dashed line). The LO has a fixed phase, letting Alice measure one specific quadrature
of the input field. (b) Schematics of SDI CV-QRNG. The input state is untrusted and can even be prepared by Eve, so it
lies outside the security perimeter (green dashed line). The LO is phase randomized by using a gain switched laser, which
allows Alice to measure random quadratures of the input field. (c) Example of attack to (d) a typical CV-QRNG and (e) an
SDI CV-QRNG, if Eve controls the input state. In (d), the LO has a fixed phase. Eve forges ρA using Q-displaced squeezed
states and guesses the raw numbers with high probability. However, Alice thinks she is measuring the vacuum state because
the decomposition chosen by Eve mimics the Q distribution of the vacuum. This compromises the security of the system. In
(e), Alice does not trust the input state as she is in the SDI setting. She uses a phase-randomized LO so that Eve’s guessing
probability depends on the random angle of the quadrature selected by the LO. Alice can then spot the attack because the
measurement distribution is wider than the one she expected from the vacuum input state.
The discretized quadrature spectrum, Qθ,δ defines
the random variable associated with the measure-
ment outcomes: each result is obtained with proba-
bility p(qθ,k) = tr
[
ρAQˆ
k
θ,δ
]
=
∫
Ikδ
dq〈qθ|ρA|qθ〉, where
Qˆkθ,δ =
∫
Ikδ
dq|qθ〉〈qθ| are the elements of Alice’s posi-
tive operator-valued measure (POVMs) applied on ρA.
If the input state can be trusted to be pure, the max-
imal number of independent and identically distributed
(iid) bits extractable per measurement is given by the
min-entropy Hmin (Qθ,δ) = − log2 pguess (Qθ,δ), where
pguess (Qθ,δ) = maxk p(qθ,k) is the guessing probability
[34] Typically CV-QRNGs trust the input state to be
the vacuum [13–20], ρA = |0〉〈0| [see Fig. 1-a], for which
the LO’s phase is irrelevant due its to the rotational in-
variance in phase space. The associated outcome distri-
bution |〈0|q〉|2 is Gaussian with zero mean and variance
σ2|0〉 = 1/2, such that the min-entropy is given by
Hmin (Qδ)|0〉 = − log2 erf
(
δ
2
)
. (1)
However, in the SDI paradigm, the measurement is as-
sumed to be under Alice’s control whereas the input state
is uncharacterized and even assumed to be controlled by
Eve [see Fig. 1(b)].
An example attack [Fig. 1(c).] can clarify the differ-
ence between the two cases [Figs. 1(d) and 1(e)]. Suppose
that Eve controls the input state. In the non-SDI case,
Fig. 1(d), she knows that Alice measures ρA along the Q
quadrature selected by the LO phase θ, which is fixed.
Eve can then input a displaced squeezed state such that
she can predict qθ,k with high confidence. To conceal
her attack, Eve displaces the states so that the proba-
bilities p(qθ,k) measured by Alice are the same as those
she would expect from her trusted input vacuum state.
Clearly, Alice could never spot this attack and she would
overestimate the actual randomness of the samples. In
the limit of infinite squeezing, Eve could predict each out-
come with certainty and the actual min-entropy would
become zero. In the SDI case on the contrary, Fig. 1(e),
Alice measures the input field on a quadrature ran-
domly selected by the LO, which is assumed to be in-
accessible to Eve. This foils Eve’s strategy based on a
squeezed input. Without knowing Alice’s LO phase, Eve
cannot determine the correct squeezing direction for her
attack. This makes the distribution measured by Al-
ice broader than the one corresponding to the vacuum,
σ2M > σ
2
|0〉, which unveils the attack.
3II. BOUND FOR THE ENTROPY
WITH PHASE RANDOMIZATION
In the presence of an adversary controlling the source,
the maximal number of iid bits distillable with a random-
ness extractor is given by the min-entropy Hmin (Qθ,δ|E)
conditioned on the quantum side information available
to Eve. This quantity considers a purification ρAE of the
input state ρA: the system E, e.g. a quantum memory,
is entangled with Alice’s system A and held by Eve who
measures it to predict Qθ,δ. The quantum conditional
min-entropy is then defined as
Hmin (Qθ,δ|E) = − log2 max{Qˆθ,E}
∞∑
k=−∞
p(qθ,k) tr
[
Qˆkθ,Eρ
k
E
]
(2)
with ρkE being the post-Alice-measurement state of E, on
which Eve applies the POVM {Qˆθ,E} [35, 36].
In the following we will lower bound Hmin (Qθ,δ|E) by
phase randomizing Alice’s states, a procedure typically
used to enhance the performance of quantum key distri-
bution with weak coherent states [37, 38].
To show the efficacy of this procedure, con-
sider the following example. Eve shares with Al-
ice a two-mode squeezed-vacuum state ρAE = (1 −
γ2)
∑∞
n,m=0 γ
m+n|n〉E〈n| ⊗ |m〉A〈m| , where γ = tanh r
and r the squeezing parameter.
Although the quadrature fluctuations look random to
Alice, the numbers are not private, as Eve can learn
them from her part of the state. However, if Alice’s
input is phase randomized, ρAE becomes ρ
pr
AE,ϕav
=
(1− γ2)∑∞n=0 γ2n|n〉E〈n| ⊗ |n〉A〈n| ,
which is a separable state that guarantees the privacy
of Alice’s numbers.
We generalize this example by considering the density
matrix of a pure bipartite state in the Fock basis
ρAE =
∑
k,l,n,m
ρk,ln,m|k〉E〈l| ⊗ |n〉A〈m|. (3)
Alice phase randomizes the input by applying the phase
shift operator Uˆϕ = e
−iϕnˆ to her part of the system,
ρprAE =
∑
k,l,n,m
ρk,ln,m|k〉E〈l| ⊗ Uˆϕ|n〉A〈m|Uˆ†ϕ
=
∑
k,l,n,m
ρk,ln,m|k〉E〈l| ⊗ |n〉A〈m|e−i(n−m)ϕ, (4)
with the phase uniformly distributed in the interval ϕ ∈
{0, 2pi}. Since Eve does not know the ϕ values, the state
ρprAE is averaged to
ρprAE,ϕav =
∑
k,l,n
ρk,ln,n|k〉E〈l| ⊗ |n〉A〈n| . (5)
This relation shows that phase randomization returns the
same outcome as a quantum non demolition measure-
ment of the photon number [39] that disentangles A from
E. In fact, Eq. (5) can be also rewritten in a manifestly
separable form [40].
Equation (5) also entails that Alice’s most generic in-
put state after phase randomization is a classical mix-
ture of Fock states, as is clear from trE ρ
pr
AE,ϕav
=∑
n pn|n〉A〈n|A with pn =
∑
k ρ
k,k
n,n. Therefore it is
equally secure to consider that Eve inputs such a mix-
ture rather than preparing a general state ρAE . The side
information is now related to the ensembles {pn, |n〉} and
the conditional min-entropy becomes
Hmin (Qδ|E)pr = − log2 max{pn,|n〉}
∑
n
pn max
k
tr
[
Qˆkδ |n〉〈n|
]
(6)
with the external maximization performed over all Eve’s
possible {pn, |n〉} compatible with ρprA,ϕav [41].
Alice can now easily bound Eq. (6) by noticing that
the largest guessing probability is obtained when Eve in-
puts the vacuum state |0〉〈0|. In fact, the argument of the
external maximization is a convex combination of prob-
abilities; hence it is automatically upper bounded by its
maximum element, that is, pguess (Qδ)|0〉 ' δ/
√
pi. The
vacuum is the Fock state with the narrowest uncertainty
in the phase space, which implies
max
k
tr Qˆkδ |n〉〈n| < max
k
tr Qˆkδ |0〉〈0| = pguess (Q)|0〉 (7)
for n ≥ 1. Hence, among all the possible {pn, |n〉}, the
trivial decomposition {p0 = 1, |0〉} is the best forging
strategy for Eve, which implies the following bound for
the conditional min-entropy
Hmin (Qδ|E)pr ≥ Hmin (Qδ)|0〉 . (8)
Consequently, when Alice performs phase randomization,
Eve’s best attack is to input the vacuum state.
III. SDI CV-QRNG WITH PHASE
RANDOMIZED LO
The scheme presented in the previous section is SDI
if we assume that a phase modulator randomizing the
input state is part of Alice’s measuring setup and Eve
cannot access it. This assumption is hardly justifiable
in practice. For example, this phase modulator could be
probed by external bright pulses [42]. Fortunately, there
is no need for this phase randomizer in our setup as the
phase randomization comes for free from a LO generated
by a gain-switched laser.
As we show in Appendix A, Eve’s density matrix after
Alice’s state phase randomization and quadrature mea-
surement with a fixed phase θ,
ρIE = trA
[(
IdE ⊗ Qˆkθ,δ
)† ∫ 2pi
0
dϕ
2pi
Uˆ†ϕρAEUˆϕ
(
IdE ⊗ Qˆkθ,δ
)]
,
(9)
4is equal to the phase averaged matrix obtained by Al-
ice after applying a randomly ϕ-phase shifted quadrature
operator Qˆpsθ,φ,
ρIIE = trA
[∫ 2pi
0
dϕ
2pi
(
IdE ⊗ Qˆpsθ,φ
)
ρAE
(
IdE ⊗ Qˆpsθ,φ
)†]
,
(10)
where Qˆpsθ,φ = UˆϕQˆ
k
θ,δUˆ
†
ϕ. Therefore the two situations
are equivalent securitywise.
The feasibility of the SDI protocol is greatly simplified
by having ρIE = ρ
II
E in Eqs. (9) and (10). Firstly, because
applying Uˆϕ = e
−iϕnˆ to Qˆkθ,δ corresponds to shifting the
LO by a phase ϕ, we can replace the phase modulator
with a phase-randomized LO, by exploiting the process of
phase diffusion in gain switched lasers [23, 43]. This has
practical consequences on security as Eve cannot tamper
with a phase modulator placed on the input port. More-
over if a real phase modulator were used to randomize the
LO phase, another RNG would be necessary to properly
drive it.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL REALIZATION
We now move on to show the phase-randomized SDI CV-
QRNG in operation. The setup is shown in Fig. 2. The
LO is a 1550 nm laser diode, with an integrated opti-
cal isolator, gain-switched to produce phase randomized
pulses. Its output first travels through a variable optical
attenuator (VOA) and is then split by a 99:1 fibre cou-
pler. The 1% output is connected to a power meter to
monitor the power of the LO. The 99% output is split
by a 50:50 coupler. The other input of the 50:50 coupler
is left open such that any input state potentially con-
trolled by an adversary could enter. A microelectrome-
chanical systems (MEMS) VOA on one output arm of
the 50:50 coupler balances the power incident on the two
photodiodes of a commercial wideband homodyne detec-
tor. An optical delay line is used to match the arrival
times of the pulses. The output of the BHD is digitised
using an oscilloscope with an analog-to-digital converter
(ADC) resolution of eight bits and a sampling frequency
of 40 GSamples/s. The main advantage of this protocol
is that the setup required is identical to a typical trusted
CV-QRNG despite offering SDI assurance. The phase
randomization of the LO is a vital part of the security
of this protocol. In practical future implementations, in
addition to the power meter for monitoring the intensity,
Alice could add an interferometer to monitor the actual
phase randomization of the LO. The LO could be further
protected from potential external phase seeding attacks
by placing an additional optical isolator in front of it.
To gain-switch the laser, the dc bias is set just be-
low threshold and the laser is driven above threshold by
applying an ac voltage from a pattern generator. When
the laser cavity is empty, the lasing action is triggered en-
tirely by spontaneous emission, which inherits its random
phase from the vacuum [23, 24]. This condition holds for
FIG. 2. Schematics of the setup. The LO is pulsed at 50
MHz via gain switching. PG: pattern generator; LO: local os-
cillator; VOA: variable optical attenuator; PM: power meter;
SP: signal port; DL: delay line; BHD: balanced homodyne
detector; Osc: oscilloscope.
FIG. 3. (a) Example of the ringing observed in the output of
the BHD when the LO is pulsed at 50 MHz with a duty cycle
of 50%. The ac driving signal applied to the LO is shown
in green, showing where the laser is on and off. The region
from which samples were taken to generate the raw random
numbers is highlighted in blue. The dashed lines show the
ADC range used when acquiring data. (b) Autocorrelation
evaluated on 106 filtered raw data points with 95% confidence
intervals for a white noise process (green), showing that this
data is uncorrelated.
repetition frequencies up to 2.5 GHz [24]. However, we
limit the clock rate to 50 MHz to minimise the signal
ringing due to the imperfect response of the BHD circuit
to higher frequency pulses.
An example of the ringing observed is shown in Fig.
3A, in which the region from which the raw random num-
bers were sampled is highlighted. The chosen pulsing
frequency also allows us to minimize the correlations in-
troduced by the finite bandwidth of the detector [44].
Filtering and randomness extraction are performed of-
fline. We first apply a 1.6 GHz low pass filter to remove
the noise above the bandwidth of the detector, then sub-
sample the resulting data taking one point every laser
pulse, giving an equivalent sampling rate of 50 MSam-
ples/s. The low frequency noise is removed by modu-
lating at 25 MHz then applying a low pass filter. The
autocorrelation evaluated on a set of 106 filtered points
with the 95% confidence intervals for lags of 0 to 400 is
reported in Fig. 3B, showing the absence of correlations
due to low-frequency noise.
5FIG. 4. (a) Typical calibration line obtained during data ac-
quisition, where the average power incident on each photodi-
ode has been calculated from the power-meter measurements.
(b) Probability density function (PDF) of filtered raw data
converted into vacuum units (blue). Theoretical PDF for vac-
uum state input in the absence of excess noise (orange).
V. BOUNDING THE MIN-ENTROPY
To bound the conditional min-entropy, we estimate the
resolution δ in vacuum units. During our practical cali-
bration, the signal port is blocked to provide a reference
vacuum state input. We measure the variance of the fil-
tered data at different LO powers P and fit a calibration
line. The intercept corresponds to the contribution of
the electronic noise to the overall variance, whereas the
gradient, m, can be used to estimate the contribution of
the quantum noise. A typical calibration line is shown in
Fig. 4A. In the absence of electronic noise, the variance
in ADC units would be given by mP and the measure-
ment resolution in vacuum units δ = δADC√
2mP
, where δADC
is the resolution of the oscilloscope ADC. The solid line
in Fig. 4B represents the theoretical vacuum distribution
used to bound the min-entropy of the raw numbers whose
distribution is represented by the histogram. According
to our framework, Alice does not make any assumptions
on the input state entering the signal port and therefore
on the raw distribution that she will observe. However,
since in our proof of principle experiment there was no
external source, it is reasonable to assume that the vac-
uum was actually the main input state. The histogram
of the raw data is then Gaussian but wider than reference
vacuum distribution because it includes excess noise.
Using Eqs. (8) and Eq. (1), we obtain a typical con-
ditional min-entropy of Hmin (Qδ|E)pr ≥ 5.53 bits. To
extract iid bits we implement a Toeplitz hashing using
a seed from another QRNG, described in [45]. Given
the length of the input string, the length of the seed was
chosen to obtain a probability  ≥ 2−100 of distinguishing
the output data distribution from a uniform one [46, 47].
As a result, 5.4 random bits were distilled from each raw
8 bit sample. With the 50 MHz sampling rate, this pro-
vides a secure generation rate of 270 Mbit/s.
To assess the implementation of the randomness ex-
tractor, we applied two standard statistical tests, NIST
[48, 49] and TestU01 [50]. The data gathered was split
into blocks of 125 MB for the NIST tests. The Rabbit and
Alphabit batteries from the TestU01 suite were applied
to all 900 MB of data at once. The post-processed data
passed all of these tests. Detailed results are reported in
Appendix B.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work we presented an experimental SDI CV-
QRNG based on phase randomized balanced homodyne
detection capable of generating secure random numbers
at an equivalent rate of 270 Mbit/s. Due to the SDI
nature of the generator, no assumption on the input state
was required.
The achieved generation rate was limited by the ring-
ing observed in the output of the balanced homodyne
detector. Any reduction of this impairment could signif-
icantly increase the generation rate.
In contrast to earlier SDI CV-QRNGs, this implemen-
tation does not require active optical components or the
use of heterodyne detection. The gain-switched local os-
cillator provides the necessary phase randomization for
the QRNG without adding components such as a phase
randomizer and a random number generator to drive it.
This also makes the setup robust against attacks probing
the internal components. These features and the overall
compactness of the generator are promising for a future
integration on chip.
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APPENDIX A: EQUIVALENCE BETWEEN
PHASE-RANDOMIZED INPUT AND
PHASE-RANDOMIZED LOCAL OSCILLATOR
In the following, we will explicitly demonstrate ρIE =
ρIIE , where ρ
I
Eand ρ
II
E are defined in Eqs. (9) and (10) in
the Main Text. We will argue that from a security per-
spective it is equivalent to place a phase randomiser at
the input of the generator or to use a phase-randomized
local oscillator. The equivalence will be proven by show-
ing that Eve’s reduced density matrix is the same in the
two cases.
6FIG. 5. The blue points are the min-entropies corresponding
to each data set acquired. The dashed lines indicate separate
sessions in between which the setup was adjusted. For each
session the entropy was estimated multiple times by periodi-
cally acquiring a calibration line approximately every 10 min.
Hence, in a session multiple data sets were acquired, each of
them with its own min-entropy bound. The minimum value
of 5.53, circled in red, was used as the experimental bound
for the min-entropy. Given the length of the input string, the
length of the seed was chosen to obtain a probability  ≥ 2−100
of distinguishing the output data distribution from a uniform
one. As indicated by the green horizontal line, we then distill
5.4 random bits from each raw 8-bit sample.
Statistical test P value Proportion Result
Frequency 0.156 0.990 Success
Block Frequency 0.567 0.990 Success
Cumulative Sums 0.917 0.984 Success
Cumulative Sums 0.038 0.991 Success
Runs 0.512 0.987 Success
Longest Run 0.668 0.984 Success
Rank 0.660 0.994 Success
FFT 0.445 0.985 Success
Non Overlapping Template 0.483 0.990 Success
Overlapping Template 0.777 0.989 Success
Universal 0.101 0.987 Success
Approximate Entropy 0.145 0.992 Success
Random Excursions 0.384 0.991 Success
Random Excursions Variant 0.335 0.992 Success
Serial 0.770 0.990 Success
Serial 0.724 0.991 Success
Linear Complexity 0.714 0.989 Success
TABLE I. Results of the NIST test battery applied on 103
strings, each having a length of 106 bits.
The most general Alice-Eve density matrix written in
the Fock basis is
ρAE =
∑
k,l,n,m
ρk,ln,m|k〉E〈l| ⊗ |n〉A〈m|, (11)
where {kE}k=0...∞ and {lE}l=0...∞ are Eve’s basis states
and {nA}n=0...∞ and {mA}m=0...∞ are Alice’s basis
states.
We define the phase shift operator Uˆϕ = e
−iϕnˆ, where
nˆ is the photon number operator, and rewrite Eq. (4) of
the main text as
ρprAE =
∑
k,l,n,m
ρk,ln,m|k〉E〈l| ⊗
(
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
dϕUˆϕ|n〉A〈m|Uˆ†ϕ
)
=
∑
k,l,n,m
ρk,ln,m|k〉E〈l| ⊗
(
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
dϕe−i(n−m)ϕ|n〉A〈m|
)
=
∑
k,l,n
ρk,ln,n|k〉E〈l| ⊗ |n〉A〈n| . (12)
We then consider the action of Alice’s quadrature op-
erator. For ease of notation, in the following we will use
the quadrature projector in the approximation of infinite
resolution Qˆθ = |qθ〉〈qθ|, by dropping the reference to the
interval δ and outcome k.
We then have(
IdE ⊗ Qˆθ
)
ρprAE
(
IdE ⊗ Qˆθ
)†
(13)
and evaluate the reduced state of Eve referred to in the
main text by ρIE by tracing out Alice’s degrees of freedom:
ρIE = trA
[(
IdE ⊗ Qˆθ
)
ρprAE
(
IdE ⊗ Qˆθ
)†]
=
∑
r
〈r|
∑
k,l,n
ρk,ln,n|k〉E〈l|
(
Qˆθ|n〉A〈n|Qˆ†θ
) |r〉
=
∑
k,l,n
ρk,ln,n|k〉E〈l|
∑
r
〈r|qθ〉〈qθ|n〉A〈n|qθ〉〈qθ|r〉
=
∑
k,l,n
ρk,ln,n|k〉E〈l| |〈qθ|n〉A|2
∑
r
〈qθ|r〉〈r|qθ〉
=
∑
k,l,n
ρk,ln,n|k〉E〈l| |〈qθ|n〉A|2〈qθ|
∑
r
|r〉〈r|qθ〉
=
∑
k,l,n
ρk,ln,n|k〉E〈l| |〈qθ|n〉A|2 (14)
We now consider Alice applying a randomly phase-
shifted quadrature operator Qˆpsθ,φ = UˆϕQˆθUˆ
†
ϕ on her part
of the system, such that now the overall phase averaged
state is:
7ρprAE =
∫ 2pi
0
dϕ
2pi
(
IdE ⊗ Qˆpsθ,φ
)
ρAE
(
IdE ⊗ Qˆpsθ,φ
)†
=
∑
k,l,n,m
ρk,ln,m|k〉E〈l| ⊗
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
dϕ
(
UˆϕQˆθUˆ
†
ϕ
)
|n〉A〈m|
(
UˆϕQˆθUˆ
†
ϕ
)
=
∑
k,l,n,m
ρk,ln,m|k〉E〈l| ⊗
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
dϕe−i(m−n)ϕUˆϕQˆθ|n〉A〈m|QˆθUˆ†ϕ (15)
By tracing out Alice’s degrees of freedom, we obtain Eve’s density matrix ρIIE :
ρIIE = trA [ρ
pr
AE ]
=
∑
r
〈r|
 ∑
k,l,n,m
ρk,ln,m|k〉E〈l| ⊗
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
dϕe−i(m−n)ϕUˆϕ|qθ〉〈qθ|n〉A〈m|qθ〉〈qθ|Uˆ†ϕ
 |r〉
=
∑
k,l,n,m
ρk,ln,m|k〉E〈l| ⊗
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
dϕe−i(m−n)ϕ
∑
r
〈r|Uˆϕ|qθ〉〈qθ|n〉A〈m|qθ〉〈qθ|Uˆ†ϕ|r〉
=
∑
k,l,n,m
ρk,ln,m|k〉E〈l| ⊗
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
dϕe−i(m−n)ϕ
∑
r,s
〈r|Uˆϕ|s〉〈s|qθ〉〈qθ|n〉A〈m|qθ〉〈qθ|Uˆ†ϕ|r〉
=
∑
k,l,n,m
ρk,ln,m|k〉E〈l| ⊗
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
dϕe−i(m−n)ϕ
∑
r,s
e−i(s−r)ϕ〈r|s〉〈s|qθ〉〈qθ|n〉A〈m|qθ〉〈qθ|r〉
=
∑
k,l,n,m
ρk,ln,m|k〉E〈l| ⊗
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
dϕe−i(m−n)ϕ
∑
r
〈r|qθ〉〈qθ|n〉A〈m|qθ〉〈qθ|r〉
=
∑
k,l,n
ρk,ln,n|k〉E〈l| |〈qθ|n〉A|2, (16)
which is equal to Eve’s density matrix in Eq. (14), thus completing the proof.
APPENDIX B: EXPERIMENTAL BOUND TO
THE MIN-ENTROPY
As explained in the main text, we calculate a bound
on the min-entropy based on the gradient of a calibra-
tion line obtained by varying the power of the LO and
measuring the variance of the filtered output. We as-
sume that this relationship holds for the data gathered
following this calibration. The performance of the sys-
tem and hence the min-entropy is likely to change over
time due to degradation of the components and chang-
ing environmental conditions. Our system therefore au-
tomatically obtains a new calibration line periodically
(approximately every 10 min), allowing the value of the
min-entropy used in the randomness extraction to be up-
dated if necessary. By taking into account the error in
the gradient m associated with the fit, we calculate con-
servative estimates of the min-entropy from the calibra-
tion lines obtained when gathering the data discussed in
the main text. The resulting values are plotted in Fig. 5.
The vertical dashed lines indicate when parts of the setup
were adjusted, changing the maximum LO power incident
on the detector. As expected, we see a corresponding
change in the min-entropy. This highlights our systems’
ability to respond to changes in operating conditions and
continue to extract iid bits. The difference between the
largest and smallest values of min-entropy obtained over
all of the acquisitions is less than 2 %. The corresponding
difference over the longest uninterrupted set of acquisi-
tions is less than 1 %, highlighting the stability of our
system. Furthermore, the number of iid bits extracted
from each 8 bit sample, shown in green, is far below the
minimum min-entropy bound obtained compared to the
variation in values seen.
8APPENDIX C: RESULT OF THE NIST TESTS
In Table I, the results of a typical run of the NIST
test are reported. The test is applied on 103 strings after
application of the randomness extractor, and each string
has a length of 106 bits.
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